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Abstract.	  Speculations	  and	  theories	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  worlds	  have	  a	  long	  history.	  In	  recent	  times,	  the	  arguments	  have	  shifted	  away	  from	  their	  typical	  philosophical	  and	  theological	  character	  to	  (supposedly)	  become	  more	  objective	  thanks	  to	  their	  scientific	  underpinnings.	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  current	  parallel	  universes	  or	  multiverse	  theory,	  which	  has	  the	  support	  of	  a	  number	  of	  famous	  cosmologists.	  	  	  In	  this	  article,	  we	  contend	  that	  the	  claim	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  those	  parallel	  universes,	  as	  presented	  in	  Max	  Tegmark’s	  book	  Our	  Mathematical	  Universe,	  rests	  crucially	  on	  some	  questionable	  probability	  arguments	  involving	  infinity.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  doubt	  is	  cast	  over	  the	  multiverse	  hypothesis:	  Is	  it	  more	  credible	  than	  the	  counterarguments	  based	  on	  philosophical	  and	  metaphysical	  considerations?	  	   	  	  	  What	  we	  call	  “the	  Universe”	  is	  in	  fact	  just	  one	  among	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  other	  universes,	  so	  far	  away	  from	  ours	  that	  they	  are	  impossible	  to	  observe.	  In	  infinitely	  many	  of	  those	  “parallel”	  universes	  there	  are	  exact	  and	  almost	  exact	  living	  copies	  of	  you	  and	  me,	  and	  yet	  other	  universes	  obey	  different	  laws	  of	  physics.	  	  	  	  The	  above	  paragraph	  lists	  some	  of	  the	  astonishing	  consequences	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  multiverse	  theory,	  as	  presented	  by	  Max	  Tegmark,	  a	  physics	  professor	  at	  MIT,	  in	  his	  book	  Our	  Mathematical	  Universe:	  My	  Quest	  for	  the	  Ultimate	  Nature	  of	  Reality	  [T].	  Although	  Tegmark	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  promoting	  the	  multiverse	  idea,	  he	  is	  one	  of	  its	  most	  visible	  advocates	  due	  to	  his	  press	  and	  television	  interviews	  and	  for	  contributing	  to	  numerous	  science	  documentaries.	  	  	  Critics	  dismiss	  this	  multiverse	  stuff	  as	  mere	  philosophical	  speculation	  since	  it	  has	  no	  empirical	  content,	  i.e.	  no	  contact	  with	  experiments,	  together	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  shred	  of	  evidence	  to	  support	  it	  nor	  any	  hint	  on	  how	  such	  evidence	  could	  come	  about.	  How	  then	  does	  Tegmark,	  a	  respectable	  scientist,	  defend	  his	  more-­‐science-­‐fiction-­‐than-­‐real-­‐science	  story?	  	  	  The	  short	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  multiverses	  is	  a	  prediction	  of	  certain	  theories.	  For	  instance,	  those	  parallel	  universes,	  including	  our	  doppelgängers,	  would	  
be	  a	  logical	  consequence	  of	  cosmic	  inflation,	  a	  theory	  developed	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  solve	  some	  serious	  problems	  that	  afflict	  the	  Big	  Bang	  cosmological	  model.	  	  	  	  	  Let’s	  listen	  to	  Tegmark	  (our	  boldface	  for	  emphasis):	  	  “It	  feels	  extremely	  unlikely	  that	  your	  life	  turned	  out	  exactly	  as	  it	  did,	  since	  it	  required	  
so	  many	  things	  to	  happen:	  Earth	  had	  to	  form,	  life	  had	  to	  evolve,	  […],	  your	  parents	  had	  
to	  meet,	  etc.	  But	  the	  probability	  of	  all	  these	  outcomes	  happening	  clearly	  isn’t	  zero,	  
since	  it	  in	  fact	  happened	  right	  here	  in	  our	  Universe.	  And	  if	  you	  roll	  the	  dice	  enough	  
times,	  even	  the	  most	  unlikely	  things	  are	  guaranteed	  to	  happen.	  With	  infinitely	  
many	  Level	  I	  parallel	  universes	  created	  by	  inflation,	  quantum	  fluctuations	  
effectively	  rolled	  the	  dice	  infinitely	  many	  times,	  guaranteeing	  with	  100%	  
certainty	  that	  your	  life	  would	  occur	  in	  one	  of	  them.	  Indeed,	  in	  infinitely	  many	  of	  
them,	  since	  even	  a	  tiny	  fraction	  of	  an	  infinite	  number	  is	  still	  an	  infinite	  number.	  And	  
an	  infinite	  space	  doesn’t	  contain	  only	  exact	  copies	  of	  you.	  It	  contains	  many	  
people	  that	  are	  almost	  like	  you,	  yet	  slightly	  different.”	  	  	  	  To	  reach	  such	  stunning	  conclusions	  Tegmark	  appears	  to	  be	  applying	  some	  result	  from	  probability	  theory;	  which	  one,	  we	  can	  only	  guess,	  but	  his	  reference	  to	  dice	  being	  rolled	  infinitely	  many	  times	  points	  to	  the	  Borel-­‐Cantelli	  lemma,	  a	  theorem	  frequently	  used	  concerning	  infinite	  sequences	  of	  trials.	  Although	  Tegmark	  never	  mentions	  it,	  the	  lemma	  is	  worth	  discussing	  if	  only	  to	  illustrate	  the	  question	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  probability	  when	  applied	  to	  reality—in	  particular	  if	  infinity	  is	  involved.	  	  	  	  
Probability	  and	  Reality	  	  The	  following	  is	  a	  version	  of	  the	  lemma	  due	  to	  Émile	  Borel	  [Bo]:	  	  	  
	  	  Let	  T1,	  T2,	  …	  ,	  Tn,	  …	  be	  an	  infinite	  sequence	  of	  random	  “trials”,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  one	  of	  
two	  possible	  outcomes:	  Success	  or	  Failure.	  Let	  pn	  be	  the	  probability	  of	  Tn	  resulting	  in	  
Success.	  If	  the	  infinite	  series	  p1	  +	  p2	  +	  …	  +	  pn	  +	  …	  converges,	  then	  the	  probability	  for	  
Success	  to	  occur	  infinitely	  many	  times	  is	  equal	  to	  0;	  if	  the	  series	  diverges,	  then	  this	  
probability	  is	  equal	  to	  1.	  
	  	  Reflecting	  on	  his	  theorem,	  Borel	  cautiously	  warns	  us	  of	  the	  perils	  of	  applying	  his	  result	  outside	  the	  domain	  of	  mathematics:	  	  	  	  “It	  is	  easy	  to	  conceive	  that	  results	  such	  as	  the	  above	  can	  only	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  realm	  
of	  mathematics,	  where	  we	  can	  effortlessly	  imagine	  the	  possibility	  of	  repeating	  an	  
experiment	  infinitely	  many	  times.”	  	  	  	  But	  what	  if	  we	  ignored	  Borel’s	  advice	  and	  applied	  his	  theorem	  to	  other	  domains	  such	  as,	  for	  example,	  a	  random	  sequence	  of	  letters?	  	  
	  	  The	  proposition	  below	  is	  a	  logical	  consequence	  of	  Borel’s	  theorem:	  	  
	  If	  symbols	  from	  the	  usual	  26-­‐letter	  alphabet	  plus	  a	  “blank”	  symbol	  (or	  space)	  are	  
chosen	  at	  random	  to	  generate	  an	  infinite	  sequence	  S:	  a1,	  a2,	  a3,	  …	  ,	  then	  the	  probability	  
for	  any	  given	  string	  of	  k	  letters	  (for	  any	  k)	  to	  occur	  infinitely	  many	  times	  in	  S	  is	  equal	  
to	  1.	  	  	  Suppose	  that,	  through	  some	  sort	  of	  mechanism	  or	  device,	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  actually	  generate	  such	  a	  sequence—I	  must	  admit	  that	  the	  “infinite”	  part	  would	  be	  a	  problem:	  there	  are	  no	  infinite	  sequences	  in	  nature,	  but	  we	  can	  imagine	  one	  through	  a	  sort	  of	  thought	  experiment.	  What	  would	  the	  above	  proposition	  tell	  us	  about	  our	  sequence?	  In	  particular,	  does	  it	  guarantee	  with	  100%	  certainty	  that,	  say,	  the	  sentence	  “we	  are	  by	  now	  so	  used	  to	  seeing	  reality	  accommodate	  itself	  to	  numerical	  
rules	  that	  it	  is	  at	  times	  difficult	  to	  appreciate	  the	  astonishing	  fact	  that	  those	  rules	  
should	  exist	  at	  all”	  occurs	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  times?	  Or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  that	  the	  complete	  works	  of	  Shakespeare	  will	  be	  recreated,	  not	  just	  once	  but	  over	  and	  over,	  with	  chance	  replacing	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  literary	  genius?	  	  	  	  There	  is	  reason	  to	  doubt	  it.	  First	  of	  all,	  we	  cannot	  guarantee	  that	  the	  “random”	  in	  the	  proposition	  and	  the	  one	  in	  the	  generating	  mechanism	  mean	  the	  same	  thing—the	  former	  is	  theoretical;	  the	  other,	  well,	  we	  don’t	  really	  know	  what	  it	  is	  or	  how	  to	  manufacture	  it.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  proposition,	  “random”	  simply	  means	  that	  every	  symbol	  has	  the	  same	  probability	  of	  being	  chosen,	  where	  “probability”	  is	  just	  a	  name	  for	  a	  number	  between	  0	  and	  1—in	  this	  case	  1/27—and	  therefore	  “the	  probability	  of	  event	  E	  is	  equal	  to	  1”	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  as	  factual	  counterpart	  “event	  E	  took	  (or	  will	  take)	  place”.	  	  	  	  	  Theorems	  in	  probability—and	  a	  fortiori	  those	  involving	  the	  elusive	  notion	  of	  infinity—	  are	  mathematical	  results;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  assuming	  that	  for	  a	  given	  physical	  system	  there	  is	  a	  sample	  space	  satisfying	  the	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  theorem	  is	  an	  empirical	  claim.	  Confidence	  in	  predictions	  based	  on	  probability	  is	  no	  substitute	  for	  observation	  and	  verification.	  	  	  The	  point	  I’m	  trying	  to	  make	  with	  this	  example	  is	  that	  existence	  in	  the	  real	  world	  cannot	  convincingly	  be	  established	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  probabilistic	  result	  (on	  this,	  see	  for	  example	  	  [Bu]).	  But	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  Max	  Tegmark	  appears	  to	  do	  to	  “guarantee	  with	  100%	  certainty”	  the	  existence	  of	  infinitely	  many	  copies	  of	  the	  Earth	  and	  each	  of	  its	  inhabitants.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  Tegmark’s	  reference	  to	  dice	  being	  rolled	  is	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  literally.	  But	  what	  is	  then	  his	  real,	  serious	  argument?	  	  	  	  By	  way	  of	  explanation,	  Tegmark	  offers	  the	  following:	  “We’ve	  observed	  that	  these	  
random-­‐looking	  seed	  fluctuations	  exist,	  so	  we	  know	  that	  some	  mechanism	  [not	  
necessarily	  inflation]	  made	  them”	  and	  that	  this	  mechanism	  “operated	  such	  that	  any	  
region	  could	  receive	  any	  possible	  seed	  fluctuations”.	  And	  he	  adds:	  “We’ve	  measured	  
their	  statistical	  properties	  using	  cosmic-­‐background	  and	  galaxy	  maps,	  and	  their	  
random	  properties	  are	  consistent	  with	  what’s	  known	  to	  statisticians	  as	  a	  ‘Gaussian	  
random	  field’	  “.	  	  	  From	  the	  above,	  and	  the	  assumption	  of	  an	  infinite	  space	  and	  infinite	  matter,	  there	  would	  follow	  the	  property	  of	  the	  Level	  I	  multiverse	  that	  “everything	  that	  can	  happen	  according	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  does	  happen”,	  and	  it	  happens	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  times.	  “This	  means	  that	  there	  are	  parallel	  universes	  where	  you	  never	  get	  a	  parking	  
ticket,	  where	  you	  have	  a	  different	  name	  […]	  where	  Germany	  won	  World	  War	  II,	  where	  
dinosaurs	  still	  roam	  Earth,	  and	  where	  Earth	  never	  formed	  in	  the	  first	  place.”	  	  	  But	  where	  is	  the	  evidence,	  either	  experimental	  or	  derived	  from	  some	  physical	  principle,	  that	  the	  random	  properties	  of	  these	  seed	  fluctuations	  would	  produce	  every	  possible	  universe—assuming	  that	  “every	  possible	  universe”	  is	  a	  meaningful	  concept?	  	  	  	  Tegmark	  does	  mention	  experimental	  data	  (cosmic-­‐background	  and	  galaxy	  maps,	  measured	  statistical	  properties,	  and	  so	  forth).	  However	  important	  these	  data	  might	  be,	  his	  far-­‐reaching	  conclusions	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  parallel	  universes	  “where	  
Germany	  won	  World	  War	  II,	  where	  dinosaurs	  still	  roam	  Earth”,	  etc.,	  hinge	  crucially	  on	  a	  probabilistic	  argument.	  	  	  	  
Incredible	  luck	  	  	  Do	  we	  owe	  the	  existence	  of	  our	  planet	  and	  its	  inhabitants	  to	  a	  stroke	  of	  luck	  of	  cosmic	  proportions—to	  “outrageous	  fortune,”	  as	  the	  title	  of	  an	  article	  in	  Nature	  [Br]	  put	  it?	  	  This	  question	  is	  prompted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  certain	  physical	  constants,	  such	  as	  the	  masses	  of	  elementary	  particles,	  the	  strengths	  of	  the	  fundamental	  forces,	  and	  so	  forth,	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  “fine-­‐tuned”	  precisely	  for	  life	  on	  Earth	  to	  exist.	  Had	  those	  numerical	  values	  been	  ever	  so	  slightly	  different,	  terrible	  things	  would	  have	  happened—the	  Universe	  would	  have	  collapsed	  or	  atoms	  would	  never	  have	  formed,	  for	  example—preventing	  the	  formation	  of	  life.	  Is	  it	  just	  incredible	  luck,	  or	  did	  some	  higher	  entity	  (a	  deity	  or	  an	  advanced	  universe-­‐simulating	  life	  form)	  design	  our	  Universe	  deliberately	  fine-­‐tuned	  to	  allow	  intelligent	  life?	  	  	  	  	  	  Tegmark	  asks	  this	  very	  same	  question	  and	  his	  answer	  is:	  neither.	  As	  inflation	  keeps	  eternally	  propagating	  through	  space,	  he	  tells	  us,	  it	  creates	  an	  infinite	  collection	  of	  Level	  I	  multiverses	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Level	  II	  multiverse.	  Now,	  according	  to	  Tegmark,	  	  “If	  there	  are	  laws	  or	  constants	  of	  nature	  that	  can	  in	  principle	  vary	  from	  
place	  to	  place,	  then	  eternal	  inflation	  will	  make	  them	  do	  so	  across	  the	  Level	  II	  
multiverse.	  […]	  A	  theory	  where	  the	  knobs	  of	  nature	  take	  essentially	  all	  possible	  values	  
will	  predict	  with	  100%	  certainty	  that	  a	  habitable	  universe	  like	  ours	  exists,	  and	  since	  
we	  can	  only	  live	  in	  a	  habitable	  universe,	  we	  shouldn’t	  be	  surprised	  to	  find	  ourselves	  in	  
one.”	  	  
	  	  Put	  it	  simply:	  laws	  and	  fundamental	  constants	  of	  physics	  can	  be	  what	  they	  are	  here	  in	  our	  universe	  because	  they	  can	  be	  different	  in	  infinitely	  many	  other	  universes.	  In	  other	  words,	  using	  the	  die-­‐rolling	  analogy,	  it’s	  next	  to	  impossible	  to	  get	  all	  the	  constants	  exactly	  right	  in	  just	  one	  throw	  of	  the	  dice—this	  is	  asserted	  as	  a	  self-­‐evident	  truth.	  However,	  if	  the	  dice	  were	  rolled	  infinitely	  many	  times,	  one	  should	  expect	  with	  “100%	  certainty”,	  according	  to	  Tegmark,	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  throw	  would	  result	  in	  a	  habitable	  universe	  just	  like	  ours.	  	  But	  where	  does	  the	  “100%	  certainty”	  come	  from?	  From	  experience	  or	  some	  physical	  principle?	  From	  a	  hidden	  assumption	  or	  postulate?	  We	  are	  not	  told.	  	  	  To	  sum	  up:	  it	  is	  not	  the	  existence	  of	  other,	  faraway	  universes—either	  as	  a	  prediction	  of	  inflation	  or	  as	  a	  mere	  possibility—that	  is	  hard	  to	  conceive,	  but	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  entire	  history	  of	  our	  universe,	  leading	  up	  to	  my	  own	  life,	  played	  out	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  in	  infinitely	  many	  of	  them.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  experimental	  evidence	  to	  back	  it	  up,	  such	  possibility	  is	  much	  too	  implausible	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  inflation	  theory	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  probability	  arguments	  involving	  infinity.	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  Tegmark’s	  claims	  appear,	  at	  best,	  as	  little	  more	  than	  a	  gamble.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
A	  literary	  digression	  	  	  In	  his	  short	  story	  The	  Immortal	  [L],	  Jorge	  Luis	  Borges	  imagines	  a	  society	  whose	  members	  live	  forever.	  “Taught	  by	  centuries	  of	  living”,	  he	  writes,	  “the	  republic	  of	  
immortal	  men	  had	  achieved	  a	  perfection	  of	  tolerance,	  almost	  of	  disdain.	  They	  knew	  
that	  over	  an	  infinitely	  long	  span	  of	  time,	  all	  things	  happen	  to	  all	  men	  (my	  emphasis).	  As	  reward	  for	  his	  past	  and	  future	  virtues,	  every	  man	  merited	  every	  
kindness—yet	  also	  every	  betrayal,	  as	  punishment	  for	  his	  past	  and	  future	  iniquities.	  
Much	  as	  the	  way	  in	  games	  of	  chance	  heads	  and	  tails	  tend	  to	  even	  out,	  so	  cleverness	  and	  
dullness	  cancel	  and	  correct	  each	  other.	  Viewed	  in	  that	  way,	  all	  our	  acts	  are	  just,	  
though	  also	  unimportant.	  There	  are	  no	  spiritual	  or	  intellectual	  merits.	  Homer	  
composed	  the	  Odyssey;	  given	  infinite	  time,	  with	  infinite	  circumstances	  and	  changes,	  
it	  is	  impossible	  that	  the	  Odyssey	  should	  not	  be	  composed	  at	  least	  once.”	  	  	  Tegmark’s	  assertions	  about	  infinity,	  stated	  as	  if	  they	  were	  self-­‐evident	  truths,	  are	  reminiscent	  of	  those	  found	  in	  the	  above	  passage.	  But	  then	  Borges’	  is	  a	  literary	  work,	  not	  a	  scientific	  one.	  	  	  	  
	  
Epilogue	  	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  my	  criticism	  of	  Tegmark’s	  multiverses	  due	  to	  his	  questionable	  probabilistic	  arguments	  should	  be	  unfounded,	  and	  that	  all	  those	  parallel	  universes,	  
in	  which	  “everything	  that	  can	  happen	  according	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  does	  happen”,	  really	  exist.	  If	  such	  were	  the	  case,	  I	  could	  take	  some	  consolation	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  infinitely	  many	  of	  those	  universes	  the	  flaws	  in	  my	  own	  argument	  would	  not	  be	  discovered—not	  noticing	  reasoning	  errors	  is	  surely	  compatible	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  physics—and	  I	  would	  then	  be	  (undeservedly)	  praised	  for	  debunking	  a	  grandiose	  theory	  that	  (rightly)	  claimed	  to	  have	  elucidated	  the	  ultimate	  nature	  of	  reality.	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